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A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING
UNPUBLISHED, NON-PRECEDENTIAL FEDERAL
APPELLATE OPINIONS WHILE COURTS AND
LITIGANTS ADAPT TO FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1
Sarah E. Ricks*
I. INTRODUCTION

Federal appellate courts are overworked. To handle their
overloaded dockets, appellate judges have adopted a wide
variety of measures intended to promote efficiency, including
deciding approximately eighty percent of appeals in nonprecedential opinions. Courts and litigants currently are adapting
to new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which
prohibits courts from restricting the citation of non-precedential
opinions. Whether it is constitutional for federal appellate courts
to issue non-precedential opinions is outside the scope of this
essay. Putting the constitutional question aside, as a practical
matter, at least for now non-precedential opinions should not be
eliminated in favor of universal publication of opinions as
precedent. That would be a dramatic break from several decades
of federal appellate court practice. Moreover, universal
publication as precedent would risk repetitive rulings and
increased need for en banc overruling of inconsistent circuit
precedent. However, as an interim measure, and without ruling
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University School of Law-Camden. J.D. 1990, Yale Law School; B.A. 1985, Barnard
College of Columbia University. I am grateful to Andrew Solomon and Amy Sloan for
insightful comments on an earlier draft, and grateful to Amy Sloan for permitting me to
read an early draft of her article If You Can'tBeat 'Em, Join 'Em: A PragmaticApproach to
Non-Precedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 Neb. L. Rev. _
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out future structural reforms, this essay proposes that federal

appellate courts modify their internal operating procedures or
local rules. Circuit courts should expressly confer persuasive
value on non-precedential opinions, provide specific criteria to
guide the publication decision, and permit anyone-not just
parties-to move the court to reissue a non-precedential opinion
as a precedential opinion. The proposed modifications would
help to better ensure that non-precedential opinions are
consistent with precedential opinions from the same circuit, that
like cases are treated alike, that issues resolved at the appellate
level need not be relitigated before district courts, and that nonprecedential opinions truly are limited to repetitive applications
of settled law.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND
CONFORM[NG RULE CHANGES

There were 66,618 appeals filed in the federal appellate
courts in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2006,
compared to 40,893 during a comparable period in 1990.1 The
number of judges has not kept pace with the docket increase, 2
and each judge now handles more
work than an individual judge
3
ago.
years
thirty
or
twenty
did
1. Admin.

Off. of U.S. Cts., 2006 Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 2.1,

http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2O06/Table201 .pdf (accessed Aug. 9, 2007).
2. Reasons for the increase have been well documented elsewhere. See e.g. Toby J.
Stem, FederalJudges and Fearingthe "Floodgates of Litigation," 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L.

377, 378, 388-91 (2003) (suggesting that "reasons for the rise in the federal caseloadinclud[e] population increases, congressional grants of federal jurisdiction to remedy
employment discrimination, broader Supreme Court interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and of habeas corpus doctrines"); see also Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished
Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 181-83 (1999); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging:
JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 3, 12-17.
3. David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over

Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1667, 1696 (2005) ("While the number of
appellate judgeships has less than doubled over the past thirty years or so, the volume of
appellate cases has risen far faster, moving from 11,662 in 1970... to over 60,000 in 2002
(excluding the Federal Circuit) .... [T]here is no dispute that the caseloads of the courts of
appeals have grown to the point where notions of individualized judicial attention to each
appeal are antiquated and unrealistic."); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert , All Right, Retired

Judges, Write!, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 227, 228 (2006) ("[W]hen I began as a member
of the Third Circuit in 1968 each judge was responsible for deciding on the merits ninety
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Federal appellate courts have adopted a wide range of
administrative remedies to more efficiently dispose of their
dockets, remedies which have been well documented by others.4
Federal appellate courts have increased the number of law clerks
assisting each judge and created a new category of attorneys
who work for the entire court (rather than for an individual
judge). Federal appellate courts have reduced the frequency of
oral argument and the time allotted for argument. They have
invited district court judges to sit on appellate panels by
designation and invited senior appellate judges to continue
sitting on panels.5 Most significantly for this essay, as an
experiment beginning in the 1970s, federal appellate courts
began issuing some dispositions in "unpublished," nonprecedential opinions. Currently, non-precedential dispositions

appeals a year. But now, each active judge in the Third Circuit decides 400 cases every 365
days."). Fourteen federal appellate judgeships were vacant as of December 2, 2007. See
Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Chart of Federal Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov
(accessed
/cfapps/webnovada/CF FB_301/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ViewSummary
Dec. 2, 2007).
4. See e.g. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts 130-32 (Harv. U. Press 1996);
William M. Richman, Much Ado about the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1723, 1725 (2005) ("Beginning in the 1970s, in response to a geometrically increasing
caseload, the judges began to abandon [the traditional appellate] model in favor of the twotrack system of appellate justice that prevails today. Now, the courts apply the traditional
model to about twenty percent of the caseload. The judges decide the remainder without
oral argument, without the traditional panel conference, and without a signed, published,
and precedential opinion.") (footnotes omitted); see Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 Hastings L.J. 1235, 1235-36 (2004) (summarizing
methods federal courts have used to accommodate increasing caseload); Robel, supra n. 2,
at 37-57.
5. Posner, supra n. 4, at 135 (observing that in argued cases in 1993, "visiting judges
(almost all of them either active or senior district court judges, whether from the same or a
different circuit, or senior circuit judges from another circuit) sat on 49.6 percent of court
of appeals panels").
6. For history of the non-precedential opinion, see J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal
Fiction of the "Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the
Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 27, 35-47 (2005); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and NoCitation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1168-72
(1978); Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: ProhibitingNon-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 Ind. L.J. 711, 717-18 (2004); Andrew T.
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential:A Recipe for Ethical Problems &
Legal Malpractice?26 Miss. C. L. Rev. 185, 189-91 (2007).
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represent the way federal appellate courts decide about 80% of
their docket. 7
The Second Circuit's recent explanation for its reliance on
non-precedential opinions succinctly states the prevailing,
docket-driven justification of the practice. The Second Circuit's
new local rule governing non-precedential opinions explains that
"[t]he demands of contemporary case loads require the court to8
be conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively,"
and therefore, the court will issue non-precedential opinions in

cases

where

"a

precedential

opinion

would

serve

no

jurisprudential purpose because the result is dictated by preexisting precedent," 9 in order "to devote more time to opinions
whose publication will be jurisprudentially valuable."
The

Second Circuit elaborated in a sentence what most lawyers
would have thought self-evident: "Denying summary orders
precedential effect does not mean that the court considers itself

free to rule differently in similar cases.""1
New Rule 32.1 prohibits appellate courts from restricting
the citation of "unpublished," non-precedential opinions issued
after January 1, 2007.12 It took more than fifteen years to enact
7. Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Annual Report of the Director, Table S-3 (2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/tables/s3.pdf (accessed Aug. 9, 2007).
8. 2d Cir. Loc. R. 32.1(a) (available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules
/FRAPLR.pdf).
9. Id. cmt.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The full text of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 is set out below:
Citing Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that
have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential,"
"not precedent," or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
(b) Copies required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, judgment,
or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible
electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order,
judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Rule 32.1 often is discussed as referring to what parties may cite in
briefs. See e.g. Patrick Schiltz, Panel Discussion, The Philip D. Reed Lecture Series,
Citation of Unpublished Opinions: The Appellate Judges Speak, in 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1,
7 (2005). However, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure govern "procedure in the
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the rule 13 because opposition was vehement, 14 for reasons that
are well documented elsewhere.' 5 Briefly, opponents argued that
permitting citation of non-precedential opinions would result in
judges spending time improving the quality of non-precedential
opinions, time better spent on law-making, precedential
opinions; would result in attorneys spending time researching
and distinguishing non-precedential opinions; and might result
in treatment of non-precedential opinions as binding. Opponents
of citation of non-precedential opinions also argued that
unpublished opinions are useless because they are produced
quickly, often by staff attorneys without careful judicial
oversight, and are too brief and shorn of factual context to
adequately explain the rationale, and therefore they are likely to
be misinterpreted by strangers to the litigation. These arguments
did not prevail, and Rule 32.1 eventually was enacted.
Rule 32.1 governs only the citation of unpublished
opinions. Justice Samuel A. Alito, who as a circuit judge chaired
the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, explained then that
United States courts of appeals," Fed. R. App. P. 1(a), and because section (a) of the new
Rule 32.1 does not specify citation by whom or what, it seems applicable to citation by
either parties or the circuit itself. For that reason, the Third Circuit's and Eleventh Circuit's
policies discouraging the courts' citation of their own non-precedential opinions seem
inconsistent with, and thus superseded by, Rule 32.1(a). See Stephen R. Barnett, NoCitation Rules under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process
473, 495 n. 135 (2003) (noting that Rule 32.1 "presumably would ban the Third Circuit's
'tradition' of non-citation, deeming it a forbidden 'prohibition' or 'restriction"'); id. at 495
(suggesting that a court's policy of noncitation should be eliminated because it may
undermine litigants' rights to cite non-precedential opinions). For the text of the relevant
internal circuit procedures, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 (available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
Rules/IOP-Final.pdf) ("The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions
as authority.") and 11th Cir. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 7, at 142 (available at http://www.cal l.us
courts.gov/documents/pdfs/BlueAUG07.pdf) ("The court generally does not cite to its
'unpublished' opinions because they are not binding precedent.").
13. See e.g. Schiltz, supra n. 12, at 6.
14. Patrick Schiltz, at the time the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, stated that proposed Rule 32.1 generated "the second-most comments received in
the history of federal rulemaking" and that comments were "marked by anger, by sarcasm,
by apocalyptic predictions of what would happen if the Rule passed." Id. at 7.
15. See e.g. Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure32.1, 51 Fed. Law. 36, 37-41 (June 2004); Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt,
Please Don't Cite This!, Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 2000 Cal.
Law. 43 (June 2000); Patrick J. Schiltz, Response: The Citation of Unpublished Opinions
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 30-43 (2005) (summarizing
opponents' arguments).
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the Rule does not take a position on "whether refusing to treat an
unpublished opinion of a federal court as binding precedent is
constitutional," nor does it require the federal circuits to assign a
particular value to the circuit's own unpublished opinions, or to
set criteria that appellate panels must weigh in determining
whether to assign precedential value to a particular opinion.16
To comply with Rule 32.1, twelve of the federal circuits
enacted new local rules or procedures concerning citation of
unpublished, non-precedential opinions. 17 The Sixth Circuit
simply permitted citation of unpublished opinions without
speaking to what value the unpublished opinions will carry. 18
The Second, 19 Fifth,2 ° Seventh, 1 and Ninth22 Circuits adopted
16. See Memo. from Samuel A. Alito, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 3 (May 6, 2005) (available at http://www
.nonpublication.com/alitomemo2.pdf); ProposedRule Amendments of Significant Interest,
at 1 (Sept. 2005) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctl 105/Controversial_
Report.pdf, select Federal Rulemaking; select Archives for Rules Effective Dec. 1, 2006;
select Controversial Report) (stating, "The rule expressly takes no position on whether
unpublished opinions should have any precedential value, leaving that issue exclusively for
the circuits to decide."); Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 27 (explaining that Rule 32.1 "says nothing
about what effect a court must give to one of its 'unpublished' opinions or to the
'unpublished' opinions of another court.").
17. The Third Circuit has not amended its pre-existing internal procedures, which
already permitted citation of non-precedential opinions---except by the Third Circuit itself.
See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7. For discussion of the Fourth Circuit rule, see infra n. 32.
18. See 6th Cir. R. 28(g) (available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/rulesand
_procedures/documents/Rules28g45a7.pdf).
19. See 2d Cir. Loc. R. 32.1(a), (b) ("[I]n those cases in which decision is unanimous
and each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by an
opinion (i.e., a ruling having precedential effect), the ruling may be by summary order
instead of by opinion.... Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect.").
20. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 (available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk
/docs/frap2006.pdf) ("Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996*, are not
precedent .... ). Curiously, the Fifth Circuit's unpublished decisions issued before 1996
"are precedent." See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
clerk/docs/frap2006.pdf); see generally Solomon, supra n. 6.
21. See 7th Cir. R. 32.1(a), (b) (available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules
.htm#cr32_l) ("It is the policy of the circuit to avoid issuing unnecessary opinions.... The
court may dispose of an appeal by an opinion or an order. Opinions, which may be signed
or per curiam, are released in printed form, are published in the Federal Reporter, and
constitute the law of the circuit. Orders, which are unsigned, are released in photocopied
form, are not published in the Federal Reporter, and are not treated as precedents.").
22. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a) (2007 amendment to 9th Cir. R. 36-3) (available at http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/467208b8514252e58825643e00658d33/$FILE/
2007_January-chngs-lst.pdf) ("Not Precedent: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this
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local rules expressly stating that unpublished opinions are not
precedential, without mentioning potential persuasive value.
By contrast, the First,23 Eighth2 4 , Tenth,2 5 Eleventh,2 6 and

Federal2 7 Circuits each expressly confer "persuasive" value on
the circuit's own non-precedential opinions issued since January
1, 2007. Further, the First and Tenth Circuits give retroactive
effect to the rule, according persuasive value to all of their nonprecedential opinions, regardless of the issue date.28
Only the District of Columbia Circuit expressly permits
citation of its own current non-precedential opinions as

Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules
of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.") (emphasis omitted).
23. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.1.0(a) (available at http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/; select
Rules and Procedures, path United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Rulebook)
("An unpublished judicial opinion, order, judgment or other written disposition of this
court may be cited regardless of the date of issuance. The court will consider such
dispositions for their persuasive value but not as binding precedent.").
24. See 8th Cir. R. 32.1A (available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newrules/
coa/localrules.pdf) (providing that "[u]npublished opinions . . . are not precedent ...
Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive
value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as
well."). The text of the rule does not make clear whether "persuasive" value is limited to
pre-2007 non-precedential opinions or instead also applies to post-January 1, 2007 nonprecedential opinions.
25. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (available at http://www.calO.uscourts.gov/downloads/
2007_Rules.pdf) ("(A) Precedential value.... Unpublished decisions are not precedential,
but may be cited for their persuasive value. . . . (C) Retroactive effect. Parties may cite
unpublished decisions issued prior to January 1, 2007, in the same manner and under the
same circumstances as are allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 32. l(a)(i) and part (A) of this local
rule.").
26. See
I th Cir.
R.
36-2
(available
at
http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/
documents/pdfs/BlueAPR07.pdf) ("An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of
the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,
but they may be cited as persuasive authority."); I th Cir. R. 36-3, l.O.P. 6 (available at
http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/BlueAPR07.pdf) ("Although unpublished
opinions may be cited as persuasive authority, they are not considered binding
precedent.").
27. See Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(d) (available at http://fedcir.gov/jan5.pdf until Dec. 31, 2007;
thereafter, at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov) ("The court may refer to a nonprecedential
disposition in an opinion or order and may look to a nonprecedential disposition for
guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give one of its own nonprecedential
dispositions the effect of binding precedent."). While the Federal Circuit rule regulates
what authority the authoring court may rely on, the same principles necessarily will guide
litigants attempting to persuade the court.
28. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.1.0(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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precedent.29 That is not an oxymoron. In a local rule that predates the new national rule, and only slightly amended since, the
District of Columbia Circuit states that "[a]ll unpublished orders
or judgments of this court ...

entered on or after January 1,

2002, may be cited as precedent,, 30 but also cautions that
"[w]hile unpublished dispositions may be cited to the court in
accordance with FRAP 32.1 and Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1) [the
latter permitting citation as precedent], a panel's decision to
issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no
precedential value in that disposition."31 The District of
Columbia Circuit rule implicitly recognizes that the precedential
significance of an opinion should not be determined solely at the
time it is issued and solely by the appellate panel that authored
it, as is the usual practice of the federal appellate courts. Instead,
the opinion's precedential significance should be reassessed by
the court or litigant seeking to apply the opinion - as is more
32
consistent with the common law tradition.
III.

AN INTERIM PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS

A national rule prescribing uniform criteria for deciding
whether an opinion should be issued as precedent and permitting
non-precedential opinions to be cited as precedent (as the
District of Columbia Circuit now does), would reduce confusion

29. While the Fifth Circuit permits citation of its older, pre-1996 unpublished opinions
as precedent, it does not permit such citation for unpublished opinions issued since 1996.
See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4; Solomon, supra n. 6, at 201-02.
30. D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(l)(B) (available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ select Rules
& Operating Procedures, select Circuit Rules).
31. D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2) (available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/select Rules &
Operating Procedures, select Circuit Rules) (emphasis added).
32. See infra nf. 36-65 and accompanying text. Like the Fifth Circuit local rule, the
Fourth Circuit local rule also is a curious hybrid. It takes no position on the value of
opinions issued since 2007, but provides that citation of non-precedential opinions issued
before 2007 is permitted (though disfavored) "[i]f a party believes ... that an unpublished
disposition of this Court ... has precedentialvalue in relation to a material issue and that
there is no published opinion that would serve as well." 4th Cir. Loc. R. 32.1 (available at
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/rules.pdf) (emphasis added). The latter language in
Fourth Circuit Local Rule 32.1 implicitly suggests that all Fourth Circuit opinions may be
read to have "precedential" value.
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caused by divergent rules of the circuits, and thus serve a goal of
Rule 32.1. However, Professor Stephen Barnett contends that, as
a practical matter, "the considerable variation in circuit practice
probably makes it too soon to impose a uniform rule" ascribing
particular weight to non-precedential opinions. 33 Moreover,
given the controversy that preceded adoption of the rule
permitting citation of non-precedential opinions, 34 there likely is
little will for the adoption of such a rule. Supporters of Rule 32.1
built consensus for the new rule in part by promising that it did
not regulate the value of opinions or determine when a
precedential opinion should issue, promises that the circuits
would remain free to determine both independently. 35 Courts

and litigants need time to adapt to new Rule 32.1, even though
the new rule likely is not a permanent solution. While courts and
litigants adapt to the new rule, as an interim measure-and
without ruling out future structural reforms-federal appellate
courts should modify their internal procedures in the following
ways.

Following the lead of the First,36 Eighth,37 Tenth,38
Eleventh, 39 and Federal Circuits, 40 each of which gives express

permission to cite non-precedential opinions for their
"persuasive" value, the other federal circuit courts should
expressly confer persuasive value on non-precedential opinions,
without being compelled to do so by uniform federal rule.
Attorneys, district courts, and future appellate panels find nonprecedential opinions helpful in predicting how settled law will
33. Barnett, supra n. 12, at 490.
34. Supra nn. 14-15 and accompanying text.
35. See e.g. Alito, supra n. 16, at 3; ProposedRule Amendments of Significant Interest,
supra n. 16, at 1;Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 27 (quoting Committee Note to Rule 32.1); see
also Michael Boudin, Panel Discussion, The Philip D. Reed Lecture Series, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions: The Appellate Judges Speak, in 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 17 (2005)
(commenting that "denominating an opinion as binding the panel does have considerable
significance, and ... would raise a constitutional problem ... if the Congress or the Rules
Committee ever sought to prescribe weight").
36. 1stCir. Loc. R. 32.1.0(a).
37. 8th Cir. R. 32. IA; see supra n. 24 (quoting rule but noting ambiguity about whether
"persuasive" value applies to non-precedential opinions issued post-January 1, 2007).
38. 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
39. 1lth Cir. R. 36-2.
40. Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(d).
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apply to novel facts, 4 ' in assessing how settled a particular rule

42
of law is,
in thinking through the legal issues, 43 and in

assessing settlement values. 4 As Seventh Circuit Judge Richard
A. Posner explains, a full picture of the legal landscape may
require familiarity with the circuit's non-precedential
applications of a doctrine:
[T]he court's published opinions alone give a misleading
impression of the judges' views. For example, reversals are
more likely to be published than affirmances, so in a field in
which the vast majority of decisions appealed are affirmed, an
appellant's prospects will seem much brighter if all his lawyer
has to go on is the court's published opinions.45
Persuasive value is not precedential value. A precedent
binds the applying court whether or not the applying court
agrees. 46 By contrast, a persuasive opinion "must persuade on its
41. See Proposed Rule Amendments of Significant Interest, supra n. 16, at 2
("Unpublished opinions are widely read by both attorneys and judges and often cited by
attorneys, district court judges, and appellate court judges.... Unpublished opinions can
be particularly helpful to district court judges, who so often must exercise discretion in
applying relatively settled law to an infinite variety of facts."); id. at 3 (describing Federal
Judicial Center study that showed a large minority of surveyed judges (55) found citations
to unpublished opinions to be "occasionally," "often," or "very often" helpful).
42. See e.g. Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 6, at 1190 ("[Tlhe weight of precedent on a
point of law hardens it[.]"); Robel, supra n. 2, at 52 (noting that unpublished opinions "can
mask significant disagreement on a court").
43. Edward R. Becker, Panel Discussion, The Philip D. Reed Lecture Series, Citation
of Unpublished Opinions: The Appellate Judges Speak, in 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9 (2005)
(observing that non-precedential opinions "give us the benefit of the thinking of a previous
panel and help us to focus on or think through the issues. For busy judges this is a great
boon.").
44. Id. at 11 (noting that "[tihe bottom line is the lawyers want [non-precedential
opinions], the market has spoken . . . [a]nd, indeed, [non-precedential opinions] help
lawyers in other ways ...[such as] in evaluating a case for settlement purposes.").
45. Posner, supra n. 4, at 167; see e.g. 6th Cir. R. 206(a)(5) (available at http://www
.ca6.uscourts.gov/intemet/rules andprocedures/pdf/rules2004.pdf) (setting out criteria
that panel "shall" consider in deciding whether to publish opinion as precedent, including
"whether it reverses the decision below").
46. See e.g. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994); Richard B.
Cappalli, The Common Law's Case against Non-PrecedentialOpinions, 76 S.Cal. L. Rev.
755, 764 (2003) ("A precedent is not somewhat binding or almost binding. It either
controls or it does not. Once distinguishing facts move a later court out of a precedent's
force field, the court is free to create the rule it considers most appropriate for the
resolution of that new fact configuration."); Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1250; Frederick
Schauer, Precedent,39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1987).
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own argumentative merits, without regard 47
for its status as a
precedent or for any notions of stare decisis."
Yet the difference is not always straightforward. Since
"[n]o two events are exactly alike[,]" the constraint of precedent
depends on how similar the later case is to the earlier case, and
thus "the relevance of an earlier precedent depends
•
,48 upon how
we characterize the facts arising in the earlier case.
Professor
Martha Dragich Pearson argues that the internal court rules
drawing a clear line between "precedential" and "nonprecedential" opinions, "as if precedent were an all-or-nothing
proposition," lack a "nuanced understanding of precedent,"
because "the ability to draw compelling analogies to nonbinding precedents, or to distinguish away apparently binding
precedents, is the 'hallmark' of the lawyer's art."4 9 Additionally,
Professor Barnett explains that "the concepts of precedent and
persuasiveness may overlap" because the existence of a prior
decision on point "tends to be more persuasive than the absence
of such a decision... [and] it is easier to follow a lead than to
blaze one's own trail." 5 While all of a federal circuit's
decisions are precedents as historical fact - meaning that a real

47. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff To Hart To West's Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 11 (2002).
48. Schauer, supra n. 46, at 577.
49. Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1236-37 (citation omitted).
50. Stephen R. Barnett, In Support Of ProposedFederal Rule Of Appellate Procedure
32.1: A Reply To Judge Alex Kozinski, 51 Fed. Law. 32, 34 (Dec. 2004); see Stephen R.
Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, JudicialConference Rulemaking,
and FederalPublic Defenders, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1491, 1539-40 (2005) [hereinafter
Barnett, Dog] (finding in informal survey that none of thirty-six federal public defenders in
circuits permitting citation of non-precedential opinions believed that citation for
precedential value would inevitably follow from permitting citation at all); Schiltz, supra n.
15, at 57 ("District court judges ... are quite capable of understanding and respecting the
limitations of unpublished opinions."); Becker, supra n. 43, at 9 (explaining that nonprecedential opinions "help district judges in the same way that they help us. District
judges know they are not bound by [non-precedential opinions], they are judges of Article
I11,and they exercise independent judgment."); Boudin, supra n. 35, at 17 (observing that
"[p]recedential weight.., is not an 'on' or 'off' switch... [as] opinions get very different
weight depending on ... who wrote them, how recently, [and] how persuasive they are");
cf Barnett, supra n. 12, at 490 n. 119 (suggesting that "the 'persuasive' effect of any prior
decision may be impossible to disentangle, in the mind of a common law judge, from the
fact that it is a prior decision-and hence, in fact, a precedent") (citation omitted).
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litigant's claim "was once decided a particular way" '-not all
prior decisions are precedents as rules: "[P]rior decisions are
'precedent' for a later decision only if the 'past [decision] is
sufficiently similar to the present facts to justify assimilation' of
the two."; When a situation similar to a non-precedential
decision arises, litigants, district courts, and a later panel
applying the earlier panel decision all should be able to rely with
confidence on the earlier panel's decision both as a historical
fact and as persuasive as to how the later, similar situation
should be decided.
Expressly conferring persuasive value on an appellate
court's non-precedential opinions can promote judicial
efficiency by reducing the chance that issues already decided at
the appellate level will be relitigated before a district court or a
future appellate panel 53 and can promote intra-circuit
consistency by signaling to the bar, district courts, and future
appellate panels that reliance on non-precedential opinions is
permissible. That is important because attorneys and district
courts may be influenced by a "general culture of hostility to
unpublished [non-precedential] opinions." 55 Explicit persuasive
value for the court's non-precedential opinions can further
promote judicial efficiency by reducing the need for subsequent
appellate panels and district courts to articulate alternate grounds

51. Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1253 (quoting Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks,
UnpublishedOpinions and the Nature of Precedent,4 Green Bag 2d 17, 23 (2002)).
52. Id. at 1254 (quoting Schauer, supra n. 46, at 577).
53. See e.g. Cappalli, supra n. 46, at 769-70 (considering the volume of nonprecedential opinions, "[i]t is difficult to doubt that considerable numbers of issues have
been unnecessarily and inefficiently relitigated in both appellate and trial courts."); Schiltz,
supra n. 15, at 53.
54. See Alito, supra n. 16, at 10 (noting that Federal Judicial Center study of federal
judges in circuits permitting citation of non-precedential opinions found that a "not
insignificant minority (36) said that unpublished opinions are 'occasionally,' 'often,' or
'very often' inconsistent with published precedent").
55. Id. at 11. According to a Federal Judicial Center study, even in circuits which
permitted citation of non-precedential opinions before the advent of the new Rule 32.1,
some attorneys did not cite a non-precedential opinion that they wanted to rely on because
'judges and lawyers were unaware of the terms of their own citation rules" and because
"some attorneys . . . may be more influenced by the general culture of hostility to
unpublished opinions than by the specific terms of their circuit's local rules." Id.
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for opinions
that rely on non-precedential
56

circuit

court

reasoning.

Explicitly approving persuasive value for a circuit court's
non-precedential opinions is consistent with the common law
tradition of permitting the applying court to assess the
persuasive value of an earlier opinion. Explaining the general
concept of "precedent," Judge Posner states that, in a common
law system, "a precedent is the joint creation of the court that
decides the case later recognized as a precedent and the courts
that interpret that case in the later cases ....

The precedent will

be declared, and its scope delineated, in later cases that rely on
the opinion." 57 In the specific context of non-precedential
opinions, the District of Columbia Circuit rule, for example,
seems to acknowledge the role of the audience or "market" 58 for
non-precedential opinions by anticipating that a future court or

56. Conversely, issuing non-precedential opinions when district courts and the bar need
appellate guidance may result in short-term efficiency for appellate courts but result in
long-term inefficiency for district courts and litigants, by encouraging more litigation and
discouraging settlement. See Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential
FederalAppellate Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created
DangerDoctrine in One Circuit, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 217, 246-49, 254-55, 259-61, 267-69
(2006); see e.g. Cappalli, supra n. 46, at 769 ("The current appellate practice of hiding
precedents may have an adverse effect on the courts' workload. The greater the number of
precedents,... the greater the number of solutions to legal issues, and the easier it would
be to determine whether an authoritative answer to a legal issue has been judicially
sanctioned."); Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1289 ("Arguments about the costs of producing
publishable opinions overlook the time savings created by relying on precedent ...
Relying on a precedent allows the decisionmaker to 'relax, in the sense of engaging in less
scrutiny of the [instant] case."') (quoting Schauer, supra n. 46, at 599); see also Posner,
supra n. 4, at t66 ("[M]ost federal circuit judges will confess that a surprising fraction of
federal appeals, at least in civil cases, are difficult to decide not because there are too many
precedents but because there are too few on point.").
57. Posner, supra n. 4, at 374; see also Cappalli, supra n. 46, at 772-73 (explaining that
"[t]he non-precedent regimen starkly reverses centuries of common law tradition" under
which "[tihe duty of determining the precedential impact of the decision-with-opinion
belonged not to the precedent-setting court but to the precedent-applying court"); Pearson
supra n. 4, at 1258-60 ("[it is the subsequent court, not the precedent court, that ultimately
determines the extent to which it is bound by the earlier decision ....
The question of the
identity between the [prior and subsequent] cases is one in which both the precedent court
and the subsequent court have important roles to play.").
58. See also Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 47-48 (favoring citation of non-precedential
opinions because that "lets the 'market' determine the[ir] value").
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litigant may recognize precedential value in an opinion that the
authoring panel predicted did not merit precedential status.59
Both lower courts within the circuit's jurisdiction and
future appellate panels are bound by a panel's precedential
decision, unless overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme
Court, even if the lower court or the future appellate panel
would have decided the issue differently. 60 The merit of
expressly assigning persuasive value to non-precedential
opinions is that future appellate panels can disagree with the
authoring panel without en banc overruling. 61 That would
conserve judicial resources, even if, as seems likely, explicitly
conferring persuasive value on non-precedential opinions would
encourage reliance on them and, in turn, encourage both judges
and lawyers to devote more attention to them.62
The countervailing view that all opinions of federal
appellate courts should carry precedential weight has
considerable force. That was the view of the late Eighth Circuit
Judge Richard S. Arnold, as famously explained in Anastasoffv.
United States.63 More recently, Professor Pearson argued that
federal appellate courts "cannot legitimately declare decisions
'non-precedential"' and that limited publication rules "are
fundamentally incompatible with a system based on the rule of
precedent" 64 because rules declaring opinions to be nonprecedential do not recognize that in a system built on
precedent, a decision's "actual effect is for the subsequent court
to determine" by "consider[ing] the similarity of the cases, the
applicability of analogical reasoning" and the hierarchy of
59. Supra nn. 30-32 and accompanying text.
60. The Seventh Circuit is unusual in not abiding by the en banc requirement for a
subsequent panel to overrule the decision of an panel. 7th Cir. R. 40(e) (available at http://
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.htm#cr4O).
61. Barnett, supra n. 47, at 12, 22-23 (suggesting that non-precedential opinions are not
subject to the "law-of-the-circuit rule" and can be overruled-or simply rejected as
unpersuasive-by subsequent panels of the same circuit).
62. While proponents of Rule 32.1 rejected the view that permitting citation of nonprecedential opinions would increase judicial drafting time and attorney research time, see
Alito, supra n. 16, at 5-6, that cost, if realized, seems worth the benefit of increasing intracircuit uniformity.
63. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on rehearing, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
64. Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1240.
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authority. But as a policy matter, at least for now, it is
impractical to eliminate non-precedential opinions in favor of
universal publication of opinions as precedent because that
would be a dramatic break from several decades of federal
appellate court practice while implementation of Rule 32.1 is
still underway, and would risk repetitive rulings and increased
need for en banc overruling of inconsistent circuit precedent.
To further promote intra-circuit uniformity, in addition to
endorsing persuasive value, circuits should provide specific
criteria to guide the publication decision, as many circuits
already do. Building on existing publication guidelines, circuits
should publish an opinion as precedent when it:
"

establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, criticizes, or
explains a rule of law;

" applies an established rule to novel facts or
otherwise serves as a significant guide to future
litigants and district courts;
contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not
duplicative;
*

resolves an apparent conflict between panels of that
circuit, or creates a conflict with a decision in
another circuit; or

*

is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting
opinion; or reverses the66decision below or affirms it
upon different grounds.

65. Id. at 1280. Additionally, Pearson argues that "[t]o declare in advance that a
decision will have no 'precedential value,' no matter how assimilable a later case may be,
is to flout the notion of constraint by precedent under the guise of expediency in handling
cases deemed in advance as not of the lawmaking ilk." Id. at 1264. Cf Solomon, supra n.
6, at 185 n. 1, 220-23 (while taking no position on whether readily available unpublished
opinions should be precedential, warning about the dangers of making unpublished
opinions precedential before those opinions are readily available).
66. The criteria suggested above are based on the Model Rule drafted by the Advisory
Council on Appellate Justice, see Reynolds & Richman, supra n. 6, at 1171 n. 28, 1176-77;
on the circuit rules and/or internal operating procedures of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits, and on the recently rescinded publication rule of
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While Judge Posner likely is correct that "the formal
criteria of publication [adopted by many circuits] are vague and
anyway often ignored,, 67 such criteria can still advance the goal
of intra-circuit uniformity by guiding the authoring panel's
initial publication decision, any motion to reissue the opinion as
precedential, and the68 authoring panel's reconsideration of the
publication decision.
To further ensure doctrinal uniformity between precedential
and non-precedential opinions, the Third Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit should amend their internal rules
discouraging
69
citation of their own non-precedential opinions.
The circuit courts' internal rules should permit anyonenot just parties-to move for publication of an otherwise nonprecedential opinion. Those best positioned to recognize
whether an opinion makes new law or fleshes out a settled legal
standard by applying it to new facts may not be parties but
attorneys who practice in that field. The authoring panel also
may not accurately predict the precedential significance of an
opinion. For these reasons, and following the lead of the District
of Columbia, 70 First,7 1 Seventh, 72 Ninth, 73 and Federal 74 circuits,
the Seventh Circuit. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 36; 4th Cir. Loc. R. 36(a)-(b); 5th Cir. R. 47.5; 6th
Cir. R. 206(a); 9th Cir. R. 36-2 (available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/; select FRAP &
Local Circuit Rules, path Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) & Local Circuit
Rules-July 2007 version available for download); D.C. Cir. R. 36; Notice of Circuit Rule
Change and Opportunity for Comment (available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/
CircuitRule32 I.pdf) (accessed Sept. 6, 2007) (reproducing rescinded 7th Cir. R. 53). The
above-suggested criteria do not address all factors that circuits have addressed in
publication plans. Similar criteria are set out in a document titled Appendix I to the Eighth
Circuit rules; however, because this document is not posted on the Eighth Circuit website
and appears not to have been updated since the enactment of Rule 32.1, it is not referenced
above. Thank you to Amy Sloan for bringing the Eighth Circuit Appendix to my attention.
67. See Posner, supra n. 4, at 167.
68. See infra nn. 70-74 and accompanying text.
69. See Barnett, supra n. 12 (arguing such internal procedures are superseded by Rule
32.1).
70. D.C. Cir. R. 36(d) ("Any person may, by motion made within 30 days after
judgment ...request that an unpublished opinion be published .... .Motions
for
publication must be based upon one or more of the criteria listed ....
").
71. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 36(b)(2)(d) ("Any party or other interested person may apply for
good cause shown to the court for publication of an unpublished opinion.").
72. 7th Cir. R. 32. 1(c) ("Any person may request by motion that an order be reissued as
an opinion. The motion should state why this change would be appropriate.").
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any person should be permitted to request within a reasonable
time that a non-precedential opinion be reissued as a
precedential opinion.
It may be true that permitting any person to move for
precedential status of an opinion would advantage repeat
litigants. As Judge Posner argues, "Some institutional
of
publication
request
systematically...
litigants..,
interests...
litigation
their
favor
[unpublished opinions] that
[resulting in] bias, in favor of the institutional litigant, in the
creation of precedent." 75 However, Professor Amy Sloan
suggests that repeat and institutional litigants may be advantaged
by limiting reissuance requests solely to parties because they
"are more likely to be the parties in prior cases they want
converted to precedential status.' 7 6 Moreover, repeat litigants
are not limited to government and institutional clients but also
may be members of the plaintiffs' bar who frequently litigate
similar claims. Finally, the ultimate discretion to issue
precedential opinions would remain with the court, pursuant to
its own criteria for precedential status.
Scholars have suggested that judges can conserve judicial
resources by writing shorter precedential and non-precedential
opinions,77 a position endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit.78 While
73. 9th Cir. R. 36-4 (available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/; select FRAP & Local
Circuit Rules, path Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) & Local Circuit RulesJuly 2007 version available for download) ("Publication of any unpublished disposition
A copy of
may be requested by letter, . . . stating concisely the reasons for publication ....
the request for publication must be served on the parties to the case.").
74. Fed. Cir. Loc. R. 47.6(c) (available at http://fedcir.gov/contents.html; path Federal
Circuit Rules of Practice available for download) ("[A]ny person may request, with
accompanying reasons, that the opinion or order be reissued as precedential. . . . The
requestor must notify the court and the parties of any case that person knows to be pending
that would be determined or affected by reissuance as precedential. Parties to pending
cases who have a stake in the outcome of a decision to make precedential must be given an
opportunity to respond.").
75. Posner, supra n. 4, at 167; see e.g. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable
Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 956-958 (1989) (arguing from results of empirical study
that issuing non-precedential opinions results in bias in favor of institutional litigants
because they selectively move for publication of favorable opinions).
76. E-mail from Amy Sloan (Sept. 27, 2007) (on file with author).
77. Cappalli, supra n. 46, at 789, 793-96; Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 52-54; see also Posner
supra n. 4, at 156; id. at 146 (arguing that opinions written by law clerks tend to be longer
than those written by judges because they have fewer demands on their time, do not know
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Professor Pearson goes farther, proposing that courts abandon
non-precedential opinions in favor of abbreviated precedential
opinions that briefly cite the existing authorities that dictate the
decision, 79 as long as non-precedential opinions are the
dominant method of appellate decisionmaking, shorter opinions
could save judges time without sacrificing quality.
Federal appellate courts should not address their docket
overburden by disposing of more appeals through one-line
orders. One argument against the enactment of Rule 32.1 was
that it would result in more one-line dispositions, or judgment
orders, which fail to explain to parties why the appeal lost 80 or
give the parties "assurance that their arguments were taken
seriously... result[ing] in less transparency and less confidence
in the judicial system. ' 8 1 While judgment orders and nonprecedential opinions both may help courts efficiently dispose of
appeals, the late Third Circuit Chief Judge Edward Becker
persuasively explained the Third Circuit's reasons for
"jettison[ing]" their former practice of deciding a substantial
percentage of their docket by one-line judgment orders in favor
what to leave out, and lack the experience to recognize when a point is too settled to
require proof); id. at 351 (arguing that "the excessive length of opinions . . . is
...inconsiderate of the time of the busy professionals who must wade through [them] and
of the clients who must pay for their time").
78. 11 th Cir. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 5 ("Judges of this court will exercise appropriate discipline
to reduce the length of opinions by the use of those techniques which result in brevity
without sacrifice of quality.").
79. Pearson, supra n. 4, at 1298; see also Cappalli, supra n. 46, at 769 (suggesting the
usual publication ratio be reversed, so that eighty percent are precedential and twenty
percent are "summary affirmances").
80. See e.g. Robel, supra n. 75, at 943; Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 26-27 (noting that in
2004, only about 3% of federal appellate court merit dispositions resulted in judgment
orders).
81. Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 39 (in summary of arguments against Rule 32.1); id.at 73
("To be clear, I am not advocating for an increase in one-line dispositions . . . [but]
providing reasons for every appellate decision may no longer be possible, given that the
resources of the courts are not keeping pace with rising caseloads."). Other supporters of
Rule 32.1 insisted that citation of non-precedential opinions would not result in courts
resorting to one-line judgment orders, see e.g. Barnett, Dog, supra n. 50, at 1539 (finding
in informal survey that federal public defenders in circuits permitting citation of nonprecedential opinions did not believe that circuits where citation of non-precedential
opinions was prohibited would react to removal of prohibition on citation by resorting to
one-line judgment orders), and the federal courts' own empirical study supported that
prediction. See also Schiltz, supra n. 15, at 64; but see infra n. 82 (noting one circuit's
former reliance on judgment orders to dispose of sixty percent of its docket).
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of issuing non-precedential opinions: "I persuaded my
colleagues that we owe a greater duty to our colleagues of the
bar and to their clients ...as a matter of respect ...[and] as a
matter of responsibility and accountability." 82 For appeals
decided on the merits, those reasons are sound.
IV. CONCLUSION

Scholars have proposed many structural reforms to remedy
the docket pressures on the federal appellate courts, ranying
from increasing the size of the federal appellate judiciary, to
restricting diversity jurisdiction, to creating specialized federal
courts, to suggesting the possibility of appellate magistrate-level
judges. The future possibility of structural reform should not be
ruled out. But as an interim measure, akin to Rule 32.1 itself,
federal courts should adopt the proposed internal procedures and
local rules to better ensure that precedential and nonprecedential opinions are consistent within a circuit, that issues
resolved at the appellate level need not be relitigated, and that
non-precedential
opinions are limited to repetitive applications
84
law.
of settled

82. Becker, supra n. 43, at 11-12; see also Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not
Making Law, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157, 162 (1998) (from 1989-96, the Third Circuit
used dispositions without comment in sixty percent of its cases; that percentage had
dropped to 32.8 percent by 1998; and it fell below five percent in 1999).
83. See e.g. Richman, supra n. 4, at 1728-30; William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 297-300 (1996); cf Posner, supra n. 4, at 132 -36
(summarizing arguments against expanding federal appellate judgeships, including the
difficulty of effective en banc deliberation).
84. The author proposed these reforms in an earlier article. See Ricks, supra n. 56, at
272-78.

